Torts--Dram Shop Act--Statutory Coverage Does Not Preclude Common-Law Negligence Action (Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1965)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 40 
Number 2 Volume 40, May 1966, Number 2 Article 10 
April 2013 
Torts--Dram Shop Act--Statutory Coverage Does Not Preclude 
Common-Law Negligence Action (Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 
381 (Sup. Ct. 1965)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1966) "Torts--Dram Shop Act--Statutory Coverage Does Not Preclude Common-
Law Negligence Action (Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1965))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 40 
: No. 2 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss2/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
overruling the Palko determination that only a part of the double
jeopardy provision-that which is fundamental-is applicable to the
states. Since the states do not now enjoy carte blanche with
respect to reprosecution for the offense originally charged, it
seems likely that the Supreme Court will only extend the pro-
hibition to include reprosecution for a higher offense, where the
defendant has been convicted of, and successfully appeals the lesser
offense included in the indictment.
X
TORTS-DRAM SHoP ACT-STATUTORY COVERAGE DoEs NOT
PRECLUDE CommoN-LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTioN.-Plaintiffs brought
an action against a tavern owner for wrongful death and personal
injuries on the ground that he had negligently served liquor to two
intoxicated men who thereafter caused an automobile collision
resulting in the alleged injuries and deaths. In denying defend-
ants motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action, the New
York Supreme Court held that an action under the Dram Shop
Act was not the exclusive remedy-that recovery for common-law
negligence was also available. Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381,
262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
At common law, the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person
was not considered the proximate cause of any injury inflicted
by the purchaser.1 Thus, while the intoxicated person remained
liable for any injury he caused to others, the act of the vendor in
selling liquor to him was not actionable by the injured third
party,2 unless the injury took place on the vendor's premises.3
When such liability attached, the seller's act was considered a willful
breach of his duty to use reasonable care in policing the premises,
which breach was the proximate cause of the injury.4
To afford a remedy against vendors for the acts of intoxicated
persons to whom they had served liquor, about one-half of the
states, including New York, passed so-called Civil Damage Acts,
better known as Dram Shop Acts.5  These statutes arose out of
the temperance movement of the 1870's. The purpose of these
laws was to suppress the sale of intoxicating liquor by making
persons who sold it liable for damages which resulted from the
ensuing intoxication.6 A plaintiff, thereunder, was not required
I Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 304 (1890).
2 Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
3 Tyrrell v. Quigley, 186 Misc. 972, 60 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
4 bid.
50gilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958
U. ILL. L.F. 175, 180 n. 30.
6 Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493 (1882).
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to show foreseeability on the part of the tavern owner,7 nor that
the sale complained of was the proximate cause of the injuries."
A plaintiff had to establish only that defendant-vendor had sold
the liquor, that intoxication had resulted from its use, and that
some causal relation existed between the act of serving the liquor
and the plaintiff's injury.9
New York State enacted its first Dram Shop Act in 1873.0
While this original act held the vendor liable for any sale of liquor
resulting in injury to third parties, today an -unla dul sale is re-
quired. 1 Therefore, the Dram Shop Act should be read together
with Section 65 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law' 2 which
makes it unlawful to serve liquor to anyone actually or apparently
intoxicated.
Recovery under the Dram Shop Act is not based on negligence,
but is founded solely on the willful violation of a statutory pro-
hibition."3 The courts have unanimously held that the legislature
intended to change the common-law rule which required that the
act be the proximate cause of the injury, by allowing recovery
against those who, in furnishing liquor, have only remotely produced
the injuries. 14 The vendor is "bound by the law to exercise judg-
ment and discretion in making his sales, and if he fails in this
respect he becomes liable for consequences." 15
The courts have not determined that the Dram Shop Acts
have completely displaced the common law in this field. While
there has been no recovery in negligence for injuries inflicted off
the premises (where the statute has been the exclusive remedy),
nonetheless, recovery has been allowed, both in negligence and
under the Dram Shop Acts, for injuries occurring on the premises.'6
In the principal case, the Court concluded that the New York
Dram Shop Act contained nothing which excluded an action in
common-law negligence. To the argument that "the statute which
creates the right of recovery is the exclusive source and boundary
of the liability and the remedy," '7 the Court replied that this
7 18 ALBANY L.J. 424, 425 (1878).8 Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 524 (1878).
9 Id. at 513.
10 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1873, ch. 646, § 1.
"'N.Y. GEN. OBL. LAW § 11-101.
12 Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 523, 240 N.Y.S2d 277
(Ist Dep't 1963).
'3 Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc. 2d 170, 174, 152 N.Y.S2d 201, 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
"4 Bertholf v. O'Reilly, supra note 8.
25 Baker v. Pope, 2 Hun 556, 557 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
'6 See Tyrrell v. Quigley, supra note 3; Kinney v. 1809 Forest Ave. Corp.,
7 Misc. 2d 261, 165 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
17 Dowling v. Stephan, 206 Misc. 518, 520, 133 N.Y.S.2d 667, 671 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
1966]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
merely limits recovery under the statute to those instances specifically
defined.
The absence of a remedy under common law was not significant,
because the threat to public safety presented by sales of liquor to
intoxicated persons was not great at that time. Contrasting the
relative infrequency of drunken-driving accidents in the horse-and-
buggy era of the statute's inception with the modern dangers posed
by high-speed travel on congested highways, the Court concluded
that the time had come to view the problem in a new perspective.
The Court reasoned that, while formerly no duty was imposed
upon the innkeeper because of the relative unlikelihood of an
intoxicated person becoming a threat to public safety, today such a
duty does exist. Furthermore, the existence of this present-day
duty might well be founded on foreseeability and proximate cause.
In supporting its conclusion, the Court noted the development of
this view in other jurisdictions, 8 which have already recognized this
problem and have determined that modem conditions require
adaptation of common-law precepts in this area.
The primary significance of the Berkeley decision is that it
offers the prospect of greater recoveries by injured third persons.
Under the Dram Shop Act, anyone injured by the acts of the
intoxicated person is entitled to recover actual as well as exemplary
damages.' 9 In the event that an injured third person dies, however,
recovery under this statute is limited to remuneration for those
injuries suffered by the decedent for which he would have had
a cause of action had he survived; it is not measured by the loss
to the decedent's beneficiaries.20  Thus, the statute provides that
the cause of action survives the deceased third party, but does not
allow a wrongful death action.
21
Permitting the plaintiff an action under the common law in
addition to his remedy under the Dram Shop Act can, under certain
circumstances, afford an injured party a more extensive remedy. For
example, the administrator or executor of a deceased's estate, in addi-
tion to a survival action under the Dram Shop Act, may also bring a
wrongful death action.22 The recovery in the survival action inures
Is See, e.g., Waynick v. Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959).
19 N.Y. GEN. OBr. LAW § 11-101.2 0 Hammell v. Mannshardt, 248 App. Div. 624, 288 N.Y. Supp. 215 (2d
Dep't 1936).2
'Bator v. Barry, 282 App. Div. 324, 122 N.Y.S.2d 604 (4th Dep't
1953).
22 A wrongful death action is a purely statutory remedy, which allows
plaintiff recovery upon proof that defendant's wrongful act was the proximate
cause of the death. Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921). Since,
in an action under the Dram Shop Act, and prior thereto, the burden of
showing proximate cause could not usually be met, a wrongful death action
generally did not lie.
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to the estate, and is limited to damages for injuries sustained by
the deceased. 23 However, recovery in the wrongful death action
goes to the next of kin of the deceased, and they are compensated
for the loss they sustained because of his death.
24
While interest is not included in an award under the Dram
Shop Act,25 it is a part of the judgment in a wrongful death action
and is computed from the time of the death until the rendering of
the award.26 Furthermore, under the Dram Shop Act, where the
injured third party dies, the amount recovered in the action which
survives him can be reached by creditors. In a wrongful death
action, since recovery is for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries,
creditors of the decedent cannot reach such sums.2 7
Another question related to the extension of the right to an
action in common-law negligence is that of territoriality. The
Dram Shop Acts do not apply extraterritorially; that is to say,
where the injury occurred in a state other than where the intox-
icated person was served the liquor, the third party has not
been allowed a statutory recovery. 28 However, under the Berkeley
decision, it would seem that the common law of the state where the
accident occurred would be applicable, and a remedy might thus be
available. In extraterritorial cases, absence of remedy under the
Dram Shop Act has been considered a factor in allowing recovery
in common-law negligence.2
9
Insurance coverage is another element that may influence the
courts. The standard liability policy carried by tavern owners does
not cover damages resulting from statutory violations. Thus, if a
judgment is obtained under the Dram Shop Act against a tavern
owner, his insurance policy would be valueless. However, if the
cause of action were in negligence, and if the judgment were
obtained against a tavern owner who carried liability insurance, the
insurer would be liable 'for the payment of the award. This was
the motivation for bringing the action in the instant case in negli-
gence as well as under the Dram Shop Act.
A possible explanation for the lack of common-law litigation
in this area is that plaintiffs have been content with the limited
form of recovery available under the statute. Furthermore, the
obstacle of proximate cause was never overcome. Before the decision
in the instant case the tavern owner was never considered to be
23 N.Y. DEcEm. EsT. LAw § 119.
24 N.Y. Dac~. EsT. LAW § 132.25 Dowling v. Stepban, 206 Misc. 518, 133 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
26N.Y. DEm. EsT. LAW § 132.
27 In re Slaney's Estate, 34 Misc. 2d 742, 228 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Surr. Ct
1962).
28 Supra note 17.29 Waynick v. Last Dep't Store, supra note 18.
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under a duty to the third person who might be injured by an
intoxicated person whom he had served. However, the fact that
such a duty was once unrecognized does not import that there
can never be a duty. "The principle that the danger must be
imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle
do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developed
civilization require them to be." S0
so MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, Ill N.E. 1050,
1053 (1916).
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